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1VISITS:  THE EMERGING PORTFOLIO
by Graham S. Pearson
Introduction
1.  The Protocol to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) is
developing and is fast approaching its final form1. Visits have received much attention
throughout the negotiations -- and rightly so, as they are an essential and effective pillar of the
future strengthened regime to ensure the total prohibition of biological weapons. Briefing
Paper No 22 -- now over two years ago -- argued the necessity for visits whilst Briefing Paper
No 183, at the beginning of 1999, demonstrated that visits are an essential and effective pillar
of the regime to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the BTWC
and  Briefing Paper No 204, in April 1999, argued that a portfolio of visits was essential for
the future regime and demonstrated how the various types of visits -- randomly-selected,
declaration clarification, voluntary declaration assistance, voluntary declaration clarification
and voluntary cooperation and assistance visits -- together contributed to an effective and
efficient regime. Briefing Paper No 20 concluded that "random and clarification visits
together with voluntary request visits all have different yet complementary roles, that are
essential and effective, to play in ensuring that declarations are accurate and complete in the
strengthened BTWC Protocol thereby enhancing the contribution that declarations make to
building transparency and confidence in compliance. They are non-accusatory and non-
confrontational and are not associated with any consideration of whether or not a facility is
in compliance with the Convention.  They are highly efficient elements of the future regime
which strengthen the regime significantly through ensuring accurate declarations yet entail
only modest resources.  Visits  also add value in that it is very unlikely that a would be
violator would risk carrying out prohibited activities at a declared site knowing that any
declared site may, albeit infrequently, be subjected to a visit."   
2.  The developments in respect of visits during the last few months are encouraging and
make it appropriate to examine the emerging portfolio of visits. It has been evident that the
discussions within the Ad Hoc Group in the area of Compliance Measures over the past few
sessions have been focussed on visits -- what these should be, how they should be carried out
and what they should not be. It is apparent that all engaged in the negotiations have developed
a deeper and clearer appreciation of the nature of visits and the importance of their
contribution to the regime.
3.   Following the September/October AHG Session, it is now clear that the concept of a
portfolio of visits, comprising randomly-selected visits, declaration clarification procedures
and voluntary assistance visits, is supported by the majority of the States engaged in the
negotiations.  This is a significant step forward.  This Briefing Paper examines the emerging
portfolio of visits and concludes that randomly-selected visits must be to all declared
facilities in order to achieve complete and accurate declarations for all declared facilities.
                                                
1Graham S Pearson, The Strengthened BTWC Protocol: An Overall Evaluation, Evaluation Paper No. 1,
University of Bradford, July 1999.    Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
2Graham S. Pearson, The Necessity for Non-Challenge Visits, University of Bradford, Briefing Paper No. 2,
September 1997.  Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
3Graham S. Pearson & Malcolm R. Dando, Visits:  An Essential and Effective Pillar, University of Bradford,
Briefing Paper No. 18, January 1999.  Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
4Graham S. Pearson, Visits:  An Essential Portfolio, University of Bradford, Briefing Paper No. 20, April 1999.
Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
2However, the frequency with which declared facilities receive such visits could with
advantage vary between the different categories of declared facility.  Furthermore, there are
benefits in keeping declaration clarification procedures in respect of both declarations and
regarding facilities that appear to meet the requirements for declaration but have not been
declared separate from the Section E Consultation, Clarification and Cooperation
provisions.
Developments during the September/October 1999 AHG Session
4.   At the end of the June/July 1999 AHG Session5, there had been a complete reading of
Article III Compliance Measures with the text being developed in a number of areas.  There
were now three sections under D. Declarations:
I. Submission of Declarations
[II.  Follow-Up After Submission of Declarations]
III. Measures to Ensure Submission of Declarations
In respect of I. Submission of Declarations, the requirements for declarations had been
developed with some streamlining and with some language from WP. 395 (Republic of
Korea) and WP.389 and 393 (Finland on behalf of the EU) being incorporated in square
brackets without discussion.  II.  Follow-up after submission of declarations had also been
developed with the alternative title of transparency entering the heading (A) [Randomly-
Selected][Transparency] Visits with the associated text being clarified through incorporation
of headings such as Benefits.  Likewise in (B) [Declaration Clarification Procedures][And
Voluntary Visit]  the language was clarified with new sub-headings such as Consultations
and Visit  appearing in the text.   Section (C) Voluntary Visits  saw the heading emerge from
square brackets with text for different procedures depending on whether the voluntary visits
are on the one hand to obtain technical advice on the implementation of declarations
obligations or to obtain technical assistance under Article VII or, on the other hand, to resolve
an ambiguity etc concerning a declaration or to resolve a specific concern as provided for
under the consultations, clarification and cooperation procedures.  As might be expected the
principal difference between these two categories was in the mandate for the voluntary visit.
5.  A particular development, which clearly reflected the experience of the OPCW in respect
of CWC declarations, was the addition of a new section in Article III D. Declarations
entitled III. Measures to ensure submission of declarations.   The provisions in this section
require the Director-General as soon as possible after the deadline for the submission of
initial or annual declarations has passed to issue a written request to States Parties which have
not submitted all their declarations and that the Director-General shall report to each session
of the Conference of States Parties on the implementation of the declaration obligations.   In
addition, within square brackets, should a State Party not submit its initial or annual
declarations within  the [6] month period following the relevant deadline, then one or more of
the following measures may be applied:
(a)  The State Party shall have no vote in the Conference of States Parties;
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3(b)  The State Party shall not be eligible for election as a member of the Executive
Council or, if already a member of the Executive Council, shall be suspended from
membership of the Executive Council;
(c)  The State Party may not invoke the declaration clarification procedure...or a
facility investigation;
(d)   The State Party may not request the Technical [Secretariat][Body] for technical
assistance under Article VII other than assistance in the preparation of declarations;
(e)   The State Party may not have access to the declarations of other States Parties;
(f)   The State Party may not invoke those provisions on consultation, clarification
and cooperation...;
6.  The strikethrough text prepared by the Friend of the Chair on Compliance Measures in
Part II6 contained language addressing the numbers of visits which proposed that "at the start
of each calendar year, the Director-General shall make initial provision, within an indicative
total of all types of visits of [140][...], for two-thirds of the total to be allocated to
transparency visits and one-third to be devoted to other visits pursuant to this Article."  It
also included provision for "Each Review Conference...may revise the indicative total, taking
into account, the resources available and the implementation of the Protocol." and required
the Director-General to report to the Executive Council every three months on the
implementation of visits and on the requests for visits.   The Executive Council would be able
to decide to adjust the initial allocations between the categories of visits, or, subject to the
availability of resources, to increase the total for all visits.
7.  This was the situation at the start of the September/October 1999 AHG session.  This
session saw particular developments in the submission of WP. 4027 proposing text for visits
by the NAM and other States which in turn led to the draft Protocol language on visits being
further elaborated.8
NAM and Other States WP. 402
6.  This working paper made a number of proposals for revised text for II. Follow-Up after
Submission of Declarations in D. Declarations as well as for E. Consultation, Clarification
and Cooperation.   It started by proposing that "the Technical Secretariat shall:
(a)  Process and analyze the declarations
(b)  Conduct a limited number per year of randomly-selected visits to
[declared][biodefence and BL4 with the principle of proportionality] facilities,...
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4(c)  If it identifies any ambiguity, uncertainty, anomaly or omission of a purely
technical nature, seek clarification from the State Party concerned,...
(d)  Provide technical assistance to States Parties to help them compile individual
facility and national declarations, if requested,..."
It goes on to provide that a State Party which identifies any ambiguity, uncertainty, anomaly
or omission in the declaration of another State Party may seek clarification from the State
Party concerned through Section E (Consultation, Clarification and Cooperation) or through
initiating the clarification process.
7.  Insofar as the visits schedule was concerned, it was proposed that "the total number of all
visits ... should not exceed [...] in each calendar year.   At the end of each year, the Director-
General should prepare a visits schedule for the following year which shall make initial
provision for the conduct of [...] randomly-selected visits, [...] voluntary assistance visits and
[...] voluntary clarification visits."    It then goes on to propose that "If during the year, the
number of invitations for voluntary assistance visits and/or voluntary clarification visits
exceed the initial provision, the Director-General shall reduce the provision for randomly-
selected visits in order to accommodate the extra visits...accordingly."
8.  The detailed provision for randomly-selected visits states that these "shall be selected on a
random basis by the Technical Secretariat from among all [declared][biodefence and BL4]
facilities.... In selecting facilities to be visited, the Technical Secretariat shall use appropriate
mechanisms to ensure that over a five-year period:
(a) Such visits shall be spread among the broadest range of types of declared
facilities, in terms of their scientific and technical characteristics;
(b) No State Party shall receive more than [...] such visits;
(c) No facility shall be subject to more than [...] such visits
(d) The prediction of when any particular facility will be subjected to such a visit
shall be precluded;
(e) [Biodefence and BL4 facilities selected with the principle of proportionality.]"
Provision is also proposed for the randomly-selected visits, "if so requested by the State Party
to be visited..., the visit shall be extended by up to three days for the visiting team to provide
the advice, information or assistance programmes requested by the State Party to be visited."
9.  Insofar as declaration clarification procedures are concerned, it is proposed that
clarification in respect of any declared facility or activity may be carried out either through
Section E (Consultation, Clarification and Cooperation) or through the declaration
clarification procedures.  If the clarification is in respect of any facility which is believed to
meet the criteria for declaration and has not been declared, then clarification shall be sought
through Section E (Consultation, Clarification and Cooperation).
510.  The provision for voluntary assistance visits proposes that the State Party inviting the
Technical Secretariat to make such a visit would indicate the purpose(s) of the visit by one or
more of the following:
"(a) To obtain relevant technical assistance and information;
(b) To implement the technical cooperation and assistance programmes of the
Organization;
(c) To obtain from the Technical Secretariat technical advice or information on the
implementation of the declaration obligations of this protocol with respect to specific
facilities."
It is further proposed that whilst the cost of scheduled voluntary assistance visits shall be
borne by the Technical Secretariat, the costs of unscheduled voluntary assistance visits shall
be shared by the inviting State Party and the Technical Secretariat.
11.  Analysis.  WP. 402 represented a significant step forward as it signified that the vast
majority of the States Parties engaged in the negotiation of the Protocol accepted the concept
of a package of visits.  Clearly, although further work needed to be done on the detailed
provisions for the precise nature of the visits within such a package, there was broad
agreement on three types of visits:
a.  Randomly-selected visits -- to all declared facilities or limited to biodefence and
BL4 facilities.
b.  Declaration clarification procedures comprising written request for clarification,
followed, if necessary, by a consultative meeting and, if this failed to resolve the
matter, by a visit to clarify the matter.
c.  Voluntary visits to provide advice on the implementation of the declaration
provisions of the Protocol or to provide technical assistance and cooperation.
12.  In respect of randomly-selected visits, these should be to all declared facilities as it is
only by such visits, albeit very infrequently, being to all declared facilities will the principal
benefit of ensuring that declarations be complete and accurate be achieved.  If any category of
declared facilities is excluded from such randomly-selected visits, the quality of the
declarations for that category can be expected to decline, and over time, become inaccurate
and incomplete.   Furthermore, it is worth noting that if randomly-selected visits are not made
to all declared facilities, the opportunities for States to benefit from the extension of such
visits by 1 to 3 days in order to provide technical information, advice and assistance would be
significantly curtailed.   The benefits from such extensions were demonstrated in the
UK/Brazilian practice visit.9   Furthermore, if randomly-selected visits were to be limited to
biodefence and BL4 facilities, many States Parties would never receive randomly-selected
visits, as they would not have biodefence or BL4 facilities and hence would not benefit from
the extension of such visits to provide technical information, advice and assistance and the
implementation of Article X of the Convention would be impaired.
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613.  However, there are arguments for the frequency of randomly-selected visits to reflect the
relevance of the facility to the Convention.    It has been argued10 previously that there would
be logic in visits to biodefence facilities -- and to past biological warfare facilities still within
government ownership -- occurring more frequently than to other declared facilities.
14.  Indeed, it is clear that the routine inspection regime of the OPCW11 has a frequency of
inspection that is related to the nature of the facility with the most frequent inspections being
of Schedule 1 facilities (which generally are national chemical defence facilities).  The next
most frequent inspections are of Schedule 2 facilities (which generally produce precursors)
and which, in turn, occur more frequently than inspections of Schedule 3 facilities or of
facilities producing Discrete Organic Chemicals (DOCs).   If the various categories of
declarations for the BTWC Protocol are considered, biodefence facilities should be visited
more frequently, past biological warfare facilities still within government ownership would
be the next most frequent category.   The most logical category for the least frequently visited
facilities would be BL4 facilities because any such facility will be closely monitored and
inspected by the State's national health and safety organization.
15.  The WP. 402 proposals for the visits schedule are such that if the number of assistance or
clarification visits to be higher than those scheduled then the number of randomly-selected
visits would be required to be reduced correspondingly -- and there is no safeguard to ensure
that the numbers of randomly-selected visits did not reduce to zero.   It would be inefficient
and ineffective to devise a regime in which the package of visits could be artificially skewed
so as to eliminate any one category.   Such a reduction in the numbers of randomly-selected
visits would also have the effect of sharply reducing the opportunities for the inspected State
Party to request an extension of such a visit for the provision of technical advice or for
technical cooperation and assistance.   As has been argued previously12, the number of
declaration clarification procedures, which may result in visits, can be expected to decrease
with time as States Parties gain experience in compiling complete and accurate declarations.
Likewise, the number of voluntary visits to provide advice on the implementation of the
declaration provisions of the Protocol can also be expected to decrease.   It would therefore
be prudent to avoid setting any absolute limit for the number of visits, of whatever category,
as there should be incentives for the future organization to develop efficient procedures for
carrying out visits making the best use of its resources for the benefit of all States Parties to
the Protocol.
16.  The proposal to invoke the provisions of Section E (Consultation, Clarification and
Cooperation) in order to address ambiguities, uncertainties, anomalies or omissions in
declarations tends to confuse the useful separation that had been emerging between on the
one hand, the Follow-up after the  Submission of Declarations, and, on the other hand, the
Consultation, Clarification and Cooperation procedures which were perceived as the first
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Biological Weapons Facilities: An Opportunity for the Ad Hoc Group, ASA Newsletter 97-6, 4 December 1997,
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11Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, OPCW Annual Report 1998.  See also Organization
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Draft Medium-Term Plan 2000-2003, Conference of States Parties,
Fourth Session, 28 June - 2 July 1999, C-IV/DEC/CRP.32, 2 July 1999.
12Graham S. Pearson, Visits:  An Essential Portfolio, University of Bradford, Briefing Paper No. 20, April 1999.
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7stages addressing "any matter which may cause concern about possible non-compliance with
the obligations of the Protocol or the Convention." and which may lead to an Investigation.
The Draft Protocol -- October 1999
17.  The outcome of the September/October 1999 AHG session was the tenth version of the
draft Protocol13 which had been developed from the previous July 1999 version taking into
account Working Paper No 402 and other changes resulting from the discussions during the
September/October session.    In Section II Follow-Up after Submission of Declarations a
number of paragraphs emerged from square brackets whilst other areas continued within
square brackets.   The text in paragraph 3 now provides that "the Technical Secretariat shall:
[(a)  Process and analyse the declarations;]
[(b)  Conduct a limited number per year of [randomly-selected visits][transparency
visits] to [declared][biodefence and BL4 with the principle of proportionality]
facilities,...]
[(c)  If it identifies in the declaration of a State Party any ambiguity, uncertainty,
anomaly or omission [of a purely technical nature] related solely to the content of the
declaration, seek clarification from the State Party concerned,...]
(d)  Provide technical assistance to States Parties to help them compile individual
facility and national declarations including, if requested, by means of visiting a State
Party..."
18. A new section, entitled Visit schedule, in paragraph 5, states that
"The total number of all visits ... should not exceed [30][75][140][...] in each
calendar year.   At the end of each year, the Director-General should prepare a visits
schedule for the following year which shall make initial provision for [the conduct of
... [randomly-selected visits][transparency visits], ... voluntary assistance visits and
... [[voluntary] clarification visits]] [two-thirds of the total to be allocated to
[randomly-selected visits][transparency visits] and one-third to be allocated to other
visits pursuant to this Article]."    It then goes on to require that The Director-General
shall submit the schedule containing the details for  voluntary assistance visits and
[[voluntary] clarification visits] already known, to the Executive Council at its first
session each year."
This goes on, in paragraph 6, to make provision that "[Each [Review Conference ...]
[Conference of States Parties] may revise the figure for the [indicative total][respective
totals], taking into account the resources available and the implementation of the Protocol.]"
19.  Alternative language is provided in paragraph 8 or paragraph 9 for a mechanism under
which the allocated number of visits in the different categories during the year can be
adjusted either by the Executive Council or by the Director-General.
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820.  Under [Randomly-selected Visits][Transparency Visits], provision is made in paragraph
17 for the selection of facilities to receive such visits.   This states that "During the course of
each calendar year, each [declared][biodefence and BL4] facility to receive a [randomly-
selected visit][transparency visit] shall be selected on a random basis by the Technical
Secretariat from among all [declared][biodefence and BL4] facilities.  The mechanism of
selection shall be approved by the first  Conference of States Parties and may be amended by
future Conferences of States Parties."   It then continues to elaborate further the selection
process by stating that "In selecting facilities to be visited, the Technical Secretariat shall
[make sure that no State Party receives more than one such visit per year][use appropriate
mechanisms to ensure that over a five-year period:
(a) Such visits shall be spread [among the broadest possible range of][over the
two]types of [declared][biodefence and BL4] facilities, in terms of their scientific
and technical characteristics;
[(b) No State Party shall receive more than [10][...] such visits;]
[(c) No State Party shall receive more than ... such visits per year;]
[(d) Such visits are [fairly][equitably] distributed among regional groups of States
Parties...]
[(e) Such visits shall be spread over a broad geographic range among a large number
of States Parties;]
[(f) No regional group shall receive more than ... such visits;]
(g) No facility shall be subject to more than [2][...] such visits;
[(h) The prediction of when any particular facility will or will not be subjected to such
a visit shall be precluded;]
[(i) Biodefence facilities and BL4 facilities selected with the principle of
proportionality.]]
21.  The duration is specified in paragraph 18 in that "[Randomly-selected
visits][Transparency visits] may last for up to two [consecutive working] days." with
provision for this to be extended if the visited State Party and the visiting team so agree.   In
addition, "if so requested by the State Party to be visited, the visit may be extended by up to
[1][3] days for the visiting team to provide technical advice or information, [or implement
technical assistance and cooperation activities or programmes as specified in Article VII,
Section D, paragraph 17,] requested by the State Party to be visited."
22.  In regard to (B) Declaration Clarification Procedures , provision is made that "Concerns
related to the declaration of a State Party shall [,as a rule,] be sought to be resolved either
through the process of consultation, clarification and cooperation as provided for in ...
section E of this Article , or through the procedures set out in this section."[Emphasis added].
Language within square brackets addresses ambiguities, uncertainties, anomalies or
omissions relating both to declared facilities and to facilities which are believed meet the
criteria for declaration and which have not been included in the declaration.
923.  Further alternatives, in square brackets, are provided for the initiation of a clarification
visit or the offering of a voluntary clarification visit.   Provision is included for Executive
Council consideration under a number of circumstances such as if the requested State Party
has declined to offer a clarification visit.
24.  In contrast, (C) Voluntary Assistance Visits is relatively free of square brackets.   The
language provides for "Each State Party may... invite the Technical Secretariat to undertake
a visit(s) to a facility(ies) on its territory.... In its invitation the State Party shall indicate the
purpose(s) of the visit, which shall be ... one or more of the following:
[(a) To obtain relevant technical assistance and information;]
(b) [To obtain technical assistance and information on the subjects specified in
Article VII ... and, as appropriate,][to implement the technical cooperation and
assistance programmes of the Organization];
(c) To obtain from the Technical Secretariat technical advice or information on the
implementation of the declaration obligations of this protocol with respect to specific
facilities."
Insofar as the costs are concerned, paragraph 126 states that "The costs of scheduled
voluntary assistance visits incurred by the Technical Secretariat shall be borne by the
Technical Secretariat.  [The costs of additional voluntary assistance visits shall be shared by
the visited State Party and the Technical Secretariat.]"
25.  As might be expected, Section E Consultation, Clarification and Cooperation has
become more complicated.   The draft Protocol in July 1999 stated in paragraph 1 that the
States Parties shall consult and cooperate "on any matter which may be raised relating to the
object and purpose of the Convention, or the implementation of the provisions of this
Protocol and to clarify and resolve any matter which may cause concern about possible non-
compliance with the [basic] obligations of this Protocol or the Convention."   The October
1999 draft Protocol extends the last few words of this sentence so that it now provides that
States Parties shall consult and cooperate "on any matter which may be raised relating to the
object and purpose of the Convention, or the implementation of the provisions of this
Protocol and to clarify and resolve any matter which may cause concern about possible non-
compliance with the [basic] obligations of this Protocol[, including cases where a State
Party identifies any [declared] facility on the territory or under the jurisdiction or control of
another State Party [which it believes meets the criteria for declaration...and that facility has
not been declared,]] or the Convention."
The Strikethrough Proposals -- October 1999
26.   Before analysing the draft Protocol as it has emerged from the September/October 1999
AHG session, it is useful to examine the strikethrough proposals for further consideration by
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the Friend of the Chair in Part II of the procedural report14.   This proposes that in Section II
Follow-Up after Submission of Declarations the text in paragraph 3 should be amended so as
to read "the Technical Secretariat shall:
[(a)  Process and analyse the declarations;]  Make a purely technical analysis of
declarations;
[(b)  Conduct a limited number per year of [randomly-selected visits][transparency
visits] visits to [declared][biodefence and BL4 with the principle of proportionality]
facilities,...]
[(c)  If it, in its analysis pursuant to paragraph 3 (a) above, identifies in the
declaration of a State Party any ambiguity, uncertainty, anomaly or omission [of a
purely technical nature] related solely to the content of the declaration submitted by
a State Party, seek clarification from the State Party concerned,...]
(d)  Provide technical assistance to States Parties to help them compile individual
facility and national declarations including, if requested, by means of visiting a State
Party..."
27. No substantive amendments are proposed to the Visit schedule, in paragraph 5, which still
contains the range of alternative numbers of visits.  The provision for revision by Review
Conferences in paragraph 6 is streamlined to read: "[Each [Review Conference ...]
[Conference of States Parties] may revise the figures for the categories of visits pursuant to
paragraphs 3 and 5 of this section[indicative total][respective totals], taking into account
the resources available and the implementation of the Protocol.]"
28.  The provision for the selection of facilities under [Randomly-selected
Visits][Transparency Visits] Visits in paragraph 17 is slightly modified although many of the
options are retained.   The proposal states that "During the course of each calendar year,
each [declared][biodefence and BL4] facility to receive a [randomly-selected
visit][transparency visit] visit shall be selected on a random basis by the Technical
Secretariat from among all [declared][biodefence and BL4] facilities.  The mechanism of
selection shall be approved by the first Conference of States Parties and may be amended by
future Conferences of States Parties."   It then continues to elaborate further the selection
process by stating that "In selecting facilities to be visited, the Technical Secretariat shall
[make sure that no State Party receives more than one such visit per year][use appropriate
mechanisms to ensure that over a five-year period:
(a) Such visits shall be spread [among the broadest possible range of][over the
two]types of [declared][biodefence and BL4] facilities, in terms of their scientific
and technical characteristics;
[(b) No State Party shall receive more than [10][...] such visits;]
[(c) No State Party shall receive more than -- [1] such visits per year;]
                                                
14United Nations, Procedural Report of the Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons
and on their Destruction, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/47 (Part II), 20 October 1999, Geneva.
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[(d) Such visits are [fairly][equitably] distributed as widely as possible among [the
regional groups of States Parties...][a broad geographic range of a large number of
States Parties];]
[(e) Such visits shall be spread over a broad geographic range among a large number
of States Parties;]
[(f) No regional group shall receive more than ... such visits;]
(g) No facility shall be subject to more than [2][...] such visits;
[(h) The prediction of when any particular facility will or will not be subjected to such
a visit shall be precluded;]
[(i) Biodefence facilities and BL4 facilities selected with the principle of
proportionality.]]
29.  The text relating to duration is tidied up in paragraph 18 to read "[Randomly-selected
visits][Transparency visits] Visits pursuant to this section may last for up to two
[consecutive working] days." with provision for this to be extended if the visited State Party
and the visiting team so agree.   In addition, "if so requested by the State Party to be visited,
the visit may be extended by up to [1][3] days for the visiting team to provide technical
advice or information, [or to implement provide any of the technical assistance and
cooperation activities or contained in the programmes as specified in Article VII, Section D,
paragraph 17,] requested by the State Party to be visited."
30. Under (B) Declaration Clarification Procedures, the language in paragraph 62 regarding
the addressing of concerns is essentially unchanged as is the language within square brackets
addresses ambiguities, uncertainties, anomalies or omissions relating both to declared
facilities and to facilities which are believed meet the criteria for declaration and which have
not been included in the declaration.
 31.  In respect of (C) Voluntary Assistance Visits one of the purposes for such visits is tidied
up so that paragraph 119 would read "Each State Party may... invite the Technical Secretariat
to undertake a visit(s) to a facility(ies) on its territory.... In its invitation the State Party shall
indicate the purpose(s) of the visit, which shall be ... one or more of the following:
[(a) To obtain relevant technical assistance and information;]
(b) [To obtain technical assistance and information on the subjects specified in
Article VII ... and, as appropriate,][to implement the technical cooperation and
assistance programmes of the Organization] To provide any of the technical
assistance and cooperation activities contained in programmes as specified in
Article VII, ... ;
(c) To obtain from the Technical Secretariat technical advice or information on the
implementation of the declaration obligations of this protocol with respect to specific
facilities."
Insofar as the costs are concerned, paragraph 126 would be amended to read "The costs of
scheduled voluntary assistance visits incurred by the Technical Secretariat shall be borne by
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the Technical Secretariat.  [The costs of additional voluntary assistance visits additional to
those provided in the initial schedule pursuant to paragraph 5 shall be shared by the visited
State Party and the Technical Secretariat.]"
32.   No strikethrough text is provided in Part II for Section E Consultation, Clarification and
Cooperation.
33.   Analysis.   The draft Protocol in Part I has consequently moved forward and now
incorporates the proposals put forward in the NAM and other States WP 402.   It is a real step
forward to have agreement on the concept of a package of visits made up of:
a.   Randomly-selected visits;
b.  Declaration clarification procedures;
c.  Voluntary assistance visits.
There are, however, a number of significant points of detail where further development is
necessary.
34. Randomly-selected visits.   The divergence here lies between whether such visits should
be selected from all declared facilities or the selection limited to biodefence and BL4
facilities.   As the purpose of infrequent randomly-selected visits is to ensure that declarations
are complete and accurate, it would be quite illogical to only carry out such visits to one or
two categories of declared facility as this would imply that completeness and accuracy are
unimportant in respect of other categories of declarations.   For an effective and efficient
regime, all declared facilities need to be the subject of infrequent randomly-selected visits.
35.  Indeed, if the limited information15 available about the number of biodefence and BL-4
facilities in the information submitted by States Parties under the CBMs (Confidence
Building Measures) agreed at the Second and Third Review Conferences is examined, the
inadequacy of randomly-selected visits occurring only to such facilities becomes apparent.
Although it needs to be recognized that just over half of the States Parties have made such
declarations and the information provided is variable, the 1997 CBM returns included some
43 biodefence facilities.  32 of these were in Western countries (19 in the USA), 1 in China, 1
in India, 9 in Russia.   Insofar as BL-4 maximum containment facilities are concerned, 48
were declared in the 1997 declarations.   37 of these were in Western countries, 1 in Belarus,
2 in Cuba, 2 in the Czech Republic, 1 in Mongolia, 1 in Poland, 1 in Russia, 2 in the Slovak
Republic, 1 in South Africa.   Based on the 1997 CBM returns, if randomly-selected visits
were to be limited to biodefence and BL-4 facilities, only 90 facilities might be visited of
which 68 would be in Western countries and the only NAM and other countries which might
be receive a visit would be a single facility in China, India, Mongolia and South Africa and 2
in Cuba.
36.  However, each category of declared facility does not need to be subject to the same
frequency of randomly-selected visits.   It is worth recalling that the frequency of visits under
                                                
15Iris Hunger, Article V: Confidence Building Measures, in Graham S. Pearson & Malcolm R. Dando (eds),
Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention:  Key Points for the Fourth Review Conference, Department
of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, September 1996.  Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc  Iris
Hunger, Private communication, November 1999, Max Delbruck Centre for Molecular Medicine, Berlin.
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the CWC varies with the category of the facility.   The 1998 Programme and Budget figures16
included information on assumed inspection frequencies for budgetary purposes:
Category of Facility Frequency of inspections
Chemical weapon production facility
closed or converted 2.5 per year on average
partially destroyed Once every two years
Schedule 1 chemical Once every two years
Schedule 2 chemical Once every three years
Schedule 3 chemical A limited number
An analysis of the figures in the OPCW Programme and Budget 200017 shows the planned
average frequencies for the year 2000:






Chemical weapon production facility 41 66 8 months
Schedule 1 chemical
SSSF 7 7 Annually




Schedule 3 chemical 429 34 3 + 5% sites≤ 20*
DOC/PSF 5500 6 3 + 5% sites≤ 20*
* The number of inspections per year per State Party for plant sites producing
Schedule 3 chemicals or DOCs is a combined limit.  The Convention states in respect
of Schedule 3 plant sites that "the combined number of inspections shall not exceed
three plus 5 per cent of the total number of plant sites declared by a State Party under
both this Part and Part VIII of this Annex [the part relating to DOCs], or 20
inspections, whichever of these two figures is the lower."   Consequently, for a State
Party with a combined total of Schedule 3 and DOCs plant sites of 20, the limit would
be a total of  3 + 5% of 20 = 4 inspections.   If it had a combined total of 100 such
plant sites, the limit would be 3 + 5% of 100 = 8 inspections.  It is noted that the
combined ceiling of 20 visits for Schedule 3 and DOCs plant sites will only come into
effect when the State Party has in excess of 340 Schedule 3 and DOC plant sites.
37.  The different priorities assigned to Schedule 1, Schedule 2, Schedule 3 and DOC
facilities reflect the different risks to the Convention.  As was noted in Briefing Paper No
1118, for the purposes of the Article VI declarations, the CWC Annex on Chemicals sets out
three schedules, which together list 43 species or families of chemical: 12 in Schedule 1
                                                
16Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Programme and Budget and Working Capital Fund,
Conference of States Parties, Second Session, 1 - 5 December 1997, C-II/DEC/CRP.1/Rev.2, 19 November
1997.
17Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Programme and Budget 2000, Conference of States
Parties, Fourth Session, 28 June - 2 July 1999, C-IV/DEC.23, 2 July 1999.
18J P Perry Robinson, The CWC Verification Regime:  Implications for the Biotechnological & Pharmaceutical
Industry, Briefing Paper No. 11, University of Bradford, July 1998. Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk
/acad/sbtwc
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(including saxitoxin and ricin, as well as blister and nerve gases and intermediates thereof),
14 in Schedule 2, and 17 in Schedule 3 (including hydrogen cyanide, which as a toxic agent
of biological origin is a toxin within the meaning of the Biological Weapons Convention).  Of
the 43, 27 are precursors and 16 are toxicants.  Each of the chemicals has been scheduled
because it is deemed to pose a risk to the object and purpose of the Convention, the chemicals
in Schedule 1 a ÒhighÓ  risk, and those in Schedule 2 a ÒsignificantÓ  risk.  The scheduling
also reflects the degree of industrial application of the listed chemicals, those in Schedule 3
being ones Òproduced in large commercial quantitiesÓ and those in Schedule 1 Òhaving
little or no use for purposes not prohibited under this ConventionÓ.
38.  It would therefore be logical for the different categories of declared facility in the
Protocol regime to have a different frequency for randomly-selected visits reflecting the
potential risk to the Convention.   As with the CWC regime where converted chemical
weapon production facilities and the Schedule 1 chemical facilities -- which are generally
chemical defence facilities -- receive more frequent inspections, there would be logic in
converted past BW facilities which still remain in government ownership and biodefence
facilities being subject to a higher frequency of randomly-selected visits.19  The maximum
(BL4) and high (BL3) containment facilities could have the least frequent visits as such
facilities are generally subject to intensive national health and safety inspections.  It is also
well known that containment is not a prerequisite for a prohibited programme and
consequently there is no logic requiring high containment facilities to be more frequently
inspected by the BTWC Organization.  Although the triggers for declarations under the
Protocol have not been finalised, it is possible to draw up a possible listing in order of
frequency of randomly-selected visits which might look as follows:
Category of Facility Frequency of randomly-selected visits
Converted past BW facilities in government ownership Most frequent
Current Defensive Programmes/ Activities Most frequent
Vaccine Production Facilities More frequent
Other Production Facilities More frequent
Work with Listed Agents and/or Toxins Less frequent
Other Facilities Less frequent
High Biological Containment (BL-3) Facilities Least frequent
Maximum Biological Containment (BL-4) Facilities Least frequent
Although four different frequencies have been shown above, this could be simplified into
three frequencies by merging the middle two frequencies (more and less frequent) into a
single intermediate frequency.   It needs to be emphasised, however, that all categories of
declared facilities should receive randomly-selected visits as this promotes complete and
accurate declarations for all facilities.
39.  The selection process for randomly-selected visits is set out in current draft Protocol text
as follows:
                                                
19Graham S. Pearson, The Ad Hoc Group:  Past Biological Weapons Facilities, in Erhard Geissler et al (eds),
Conversion of Past BTW Facilities, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1998.   Graham S. Pearson, Past
Biological Weapons Facilities: An Opportunity for the Ad Hoc Group, ASA Newsletter 97-6, 4 December 1997,
p.1, 16-17.  Graham S. Pearson, The Strengthened BTWC Protocol: An Integrated Regime, University of
Bradford, Briefing Paper No. 10, July 1998.  Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
15
"During the course of each calendar year, each [declared][biodefence and BL4]
facility to receive a [randomly-selected visit][transparency visit] shall be selected on
a random basis by the Technical Secretariat from among all [declared][biodefence
and BL4] facilities.  The mechanism of selection shall be approved by the first
Conference of States Parties and may be amended by future Conferences of States
Parties."   
It then continues to elaborate further the selection process by stating that
"In selecting facilities to be visited, the Technical Secretariat shall [make sure that no
State Party receives more than one such visit per year][use appropriate mechanisms
to ensure that over a five-year period:
(a) Such visits shall be spread [among the broadest possible range of][over
the two]types of [declared][biodefence and BL4] facilities, in terms of their
scientific and technical characteristics;
[(b) No State Party shall receive more than [10][...] such visits;]
[(c) No State Party shall receive more than ... such visits per year;]
[(d) Such visits are [fairly][equitably] distributed among regional groups of
States Parties...]
[(e) Such visits shall be spread over a broad geographic range among a large
number of States Parties;]
[(f) No regional group shall receive more than ... such visits;]
(g) No facility shall be subject to more than [2][...] such visits;
[(h) The prediction of when any particular facility will or will not be subjected
to such a visit shall be precluded;]
[(i) Biodefence facilities and BL4 facilities selected with the principle of
proportionality.]]
40.  It is recommended that this text should be amended so as to remove the language:
a. preventing a single State Party from receiving one such visit a year because such an
arrangement would mean that one a State Party had received such a visit, it would
then know that it would not receive a further visit during the same year, thereby
contravening the requirement to preclude the prediction of when any particular
facility will or will not be subjected to such a visit.
b. limiting such visits to biodefence and BL-4 facilities as randomly-selected visits
need to be made to all categories of declared facilities.  However, language could
usefully be introduced requiring the frequency with which different categories of
declared facilities should reflect the risk posed to the Convention.
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c. limiting the number of visits to a State Party to an absolute number.   A formula
linking the number of visits to the number of facilities declared by a State Party would
appear to be preferable provided the minimum number is not so small as to negate the
non-predictability requirement.  Over a five year period, a number of five or more is
needed to achieve this.
41.   The selection process in the Protocol text could usefully be developed to read as follows:
"In selecting facilities to be visited, the Technical Secretariat shall [make sure that no
State Party receives more than one such visit per year][ use appropriate mechanisms
to ensure that over a five-year period:
(a) Such visits shall be spread [among the broadest possible range of ][over
the two] types of [declared][biodefence and BL4] facilities, in terms of their
scientific and technical characteristics;
[(b) No The number of visits to a State Party shall not exceed more than 5
plus 5 per cent of the total number of facilities declared by the State Party or
20 visits, whichever of these two figures is the lower; receive more than
[10][...] such visits;]
[(c) No State Party shall receive more than ... such visits per year;]
(c) Such visits are distributed among the categories of declared facilities to
reflect the risk posed by that category of facilities to the Convention;
[(d) Such visits are [fairly][equitably] distributed among regional groups of
States Parties...]
[(e) Such visits shall be spread over a broad geographic range among a large
number of States Parties;]
[(f) No regional group shall receive more than ... such visits;]
(g) No facility shall be subject to more than [ 2 ][...] such visits;
[(h) The prediction of when any particular facility will or will not be subjected
to such a visit shall be precluded;]
[(i) Biodefence facilities and BL4 facilities selected with the principle of
proportionality.]]
42.  Declaration Clarification Procedures.  Insofar as ambiguities, uncertainties, anomalies
and omissions relating to declared facilities are concerned, although there are some
differences in the detail, there is a considerable similarity in the approach.  Following
correspondence and, if this fails to resolve the issue, a consultative visit, then should the
matter still be unresolved then a clarification visit should either be requested or invited.   The
differences between a voluntary and a requested clarification visit are not as great as might
seem as a requested clarification visit can be declined by the requested State Party if it
considers that it has made every reasonable effort to resolve the matter.  In such a case, the
matter will be referred to the Executive Council.
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43.  The principal divergence relates to facilities that should have been declared. One
approach is to separate out clarification of any ambiguities, uncertainties, anomalies or
omissions relating to facilities that appear to meet the criteria for declaration but which have
not been declared into Section E Consultation, Clarification and Cooperation which had,
hitherto, been primarily concerned with concerns about possible non-compliance and was a
procedure that would be followed prior to a request for an investigation.   As there has been
much confusion over the role of visits -- which are non-confrontational and non-accusatory --
there is much to be said for not suggesting that clarification of any ambiguities, uncertainties,
anomalies or omissions relating to facilities that appear to meet the criteria for declaration but
which have not been declared should be addressed in a section outside Section II Follow-Up
to Submission of Declarations.   The logical place to address any ambiguities, uncertainties,
anomalies or omissions relating to declarations, including omissions from declarations, is in
Section II Follow-Up to Submission of Declarations.
44.  In the general context of clarification of declarations, it should be noted that the OPCW
Annual Report 199820 in its account of inspections carried out at Schedule 1 facilities notes
that 12 such facilities had been inspected and states that "By the end of 1998 the need for
amended declarations was the main issue identified by the Secretariat as requiring further
attention." [Emphasis added].   In respect of Schedule 2 facilities, the report notes that 68
Schedule 2 plant sites were inspected and goes on to state "The need for amended
declarations was the main issue identified as requiring further attention in Schedule 2
inspection final inspection reports in 1998." [Emphasis added].   13 Schedule 3 plant sites
were inspected and it was again noted that "... the need for amended declarations to be
submitted by the inspected States Parties was the main issue identified as requiring further
attention." [Emphasis added].   It is thus evident from the OPCW experience that visits under
the Protocol are likely to result in the identification of the need for amended declarations.
Consequently, clarification of declarations will be somewhat frequent, at least during the
early stages of the new regime.  The value of infrequent randomly-selected visits to ensure
that declarations are complete and accurate is thus clear.
45.  Voluntary assistance visits.  The current text is tightly limited in that the extension of the
randomly-selected visits may be limited to "technical assistance and cooperation activities or
programmes as specified in Article VII, Section D, paragraph 17" and there is similar
language for voluntary assistance visits, albeit without yet specifying specific paragraphs
although it is clear that the intention is to specify particular paragraphs, "To obtain technical
assistance and information on the subjects specified in Article VII, paragraphs ...".   It is
noted that whilst the draft Protocol refers to paragraph 17 of Article VII, it is paragraph 18
that is  headed "Cooperation and assistance in the context of visits".  This illustrates the
desirability of not being unduly restrictive.  It would be better to refer to Article VII and not
to a specific paragraph.  Afterall, the programme and budget of the future BTWC
Organization will be controlled and approved by the Conference of the States Parties.
Concluding Remarks
46.  It is a significant step forward that the Protocol now includes provision for a portfolio of
visits -- comprising randomly-selected visits, declaration clarification procedures and
voluntary assistance visits -- which are supported by the majority of the States engaged in the
                                                
20Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, OPCW Annual Report 1998.
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negotiations.   Insofar as randomly-selected visits are concerned these must be to all
categories of declared facilities.   Limitation to one or more categories would significantly
impair the benefits from such visits of ensuring that all declarations are both accurate and
complete and would also curtail the benefits from extension of such visits to enable technical
information, advice and assistance to be provided.   However, the frequency with which
declared facilities receive randomly-selected visits could with advantage vary between the
different categories of declared facilities -- with past biological weapons facilities still
remaining in government ownership and biodefence facilities receiving the highest frequency
of visits and other facilities, such as the BL4 facilities, receiving the lowest frequency of
visits.
47.  There are also advantages in keeping declaration clarification procedures separate from
the provisions of Section E Consultation, Clarification and Cooperation which are best
regarded as being concerned with non-compliance aspects and the forerunner of a possible
investigation.   It needs to be recognised that initially States Parties will inadvertently make
errors and omissions in compiling their declarations.  A low key non-confrontational non-
accusatory process is the best way of resolving such errors and omissions whether relating to
declarations or to what appear to meet the requirements for declaration but have not been
declared.   Afterall, having such a low key declaration clarification procedure does not in any
way remove from any State Party the right that it has to raise a matter under Section E
Consultation, Clarification and Cooperation should it feel that it has a concern about non-
compliance.
